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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Following a jury trial, Traci Hartley was convicted of two counts of felony 
possession of a controlled substance (methadone and Methylphenidate), and one 
misdemeanor count of possession of a controlled substance (Alprazolam). However, 
during trial, the district court permitted the State to introduce prior bad acts evidence 
against Ms. Hartley in rebuttal, over Ms. Hartley's repeated and strenuous objections. 
Ms. Hartley asserts that the district court erred when it allowed the State to introduce 
this evidence, which merely served to demonstrate her criminal propensity to unlawfully 
possess prescription medications. Additionally, she asserts that the admission of this 
evidence was not harmless, caused her prejudice as to all three charged offenses in 
this case, and that the error was not cured by the limiting instruction provided by the 
district court. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Traci Hartley was charged with two counts of felony possession of a controlled 
substance (methadone and Methylphenidate) and one misdemeanor count of 
possession of a controlled substance (Alprazolam). (R., pp.25-26.) Prior to trial, the 
State filed a notice indicating its intent to introduce prior bad acts evidence pursuant to 
I.R.E. 404(b) at Ms. Hartley's trial. (R., pp.39-40.) These alleged acts encompassed a 
different police contact with Ms. Hartley when she was the passenger in a vehicle that 
was subject to a traffic stop. (R., ppp.39-40.) According to the State's allegations, on 
this prior occasion, Ms. Hartley was in possession of a controlled substance -
methadone - by police during the stop. (R., pp.39-40.) The State also claimed that 
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Ms. Hartley admitted to police that the pills were hers and that they were methadone. 
(R., pp.39-40.) Based upon these alleged facts, the State also pointed out that 
Ms. Hartley was facing charges in another county for possession of a controlled 
substance. (R., p.40.) 
At the hearing on the State's notice of intent to introduce prior bad acts evidence, 
the State clarified that the alleged prior bad act was limited in its relevance primarily to 
the charge that Ms. Hartley possessed methadone. (8/9/10 Tr. 1, p.6, Ls.4-8.) In 
response, Ms. Hartley objected to the introduction of this evidence as being irrelevant to 
the material issues at trial, improper propensity evidence, and because the danger of 
unfair prejudice from the introduction of this evidence outweighed any probative value. 
(8/9/10 Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.15, L. 14.) She further noted for the court that introducing this 
evidence posed a danger of confusing the jury as to the material issues at trial. (8/9/1 O 
Tr., p.15, Ls.15-22.) The State responded that the evidence was relevant to 
demonstrate Ms. Hartley's knowledge that the pills were controlled substances and to 
further show her intent to possess the methadone pills. (8/9/10 Tr., p.16, L.12 - p.17, 
L.14.) 
The district court indicated that the only basis of relevance for the prior bad acts 
evidence alleged by the State was the issue of whether Ms. Hartley had the intent to 
control the methadone pills that formed the basis of one of her charged offenses. 
1 Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, for ease 
of reference, citations made herein to the transcripts are made with reference to the 
date of the proceeding transcribed. Additionally, there are two transcripts of the 
proceedings during Ms. Hartley's first day of trial on August 10, 2010 - one covering the 
proceedings from that morning until the noon break, and one covering the afternoon and 
evening proceedings. The transcript of proceedings for the morning of August 10, 2010 
is referenced within this brief as, "Vol. 1 8/10/10 Tr.," and the afternoon proceedings are 
cited to herein as, "Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr." 
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(8/9/10 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-21.) The court ruled that the prior bad acts evidence alleged by 
the State would be admissible for this purpose as to the first count only. (8/9/1 O 
Tr., p.19, L.10-p.20, L.21.) 
However, the district court partially reversed itself on this ruling on the morning of 
Ms. Hartley's trial. After reflection, the court ruled that none of the allegations of prior 
bad acts evidence would be admissible in the State's case-in-chief, as the alleged acts 
were not sufficiently relevant to Ms. Hartley's intent on the day in question to be 
admissible. (Vol. 1 8/10/10 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.8.) The district court did leave open 
the possibility that the prior bad acts evidence might be admissible in rebuttal, 
depending on what evidence (if any) Ms. Hartley presented at trial. (Vol. 1 8/10/10 
Tr., p.8, Ls.9-25.) But the State was required to make a motion to introduce such 
evidence outside of the presence of the jury before any evidence alleging Ms. Hartley's 
prior possession of methadone could be introduced. (Vol. 1 8/10/10 Tr., p.8, Ls.20-25.) 
The first witness presented by the State was Officer Matt Schneider, who was the 
officer who originally pulled over Ms. Hartley and allegedly found prescription drugs in 
her purse. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.20, L.21 - p.21, L.6, p.24, L.5 - p.27, L.2.) The officer 
testified that, during a traffic stop of Ms. Hartley's car, he saw her digging through her 
purse and caught a glimpse of two prescription bottles - but that neither bottle still had 
the prescription label attached. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.26, L.13 - p.17, L.6.) Upon being 
questioned about the pills, Officer Schneider testified that Ms. Hartley admitted the pills 
were hers. According to his testimony, she stated that she had methadone pills due to 
injuries from a prior car accident, Methylphenidate2 for treatment of her attention deficit 
2 Although the officer referred to the Methylphenidate pills by a common brand name 
(Ritalin), in order to maintain consistency these pills are referred to in this brief by the 
actual chemical compound rather than any brand name. 
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disorder, and the third pills were to assist her in staying awake at night for her job. (Vol. 
2 8/10/10 Tr., p.27, Ls.7-24.) She also allegedly told the officer that the prescription 
labels had simply fallen off of the bottles. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.27, L.25 - p.28, L.7.) 
The officer initially testified that Ms. Hartley informed the officer that she was a 
nurse, but did not ever claim that the pills belonged to anyone else or that she was 
holding on to another patient's pills in her professional capacity as a nurse. (Vol. 2 
8/10/10 Tr., p.28, Ls.8-13.) However, after reviewing his prior testimony at the 
preliminary hearing, Officer Schneider admitted that Ms. Hartley may have, in fact, told 
him during the traffic stop that the medications actually belonged to another individual 
who she was caring for as a nurse. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.49, L. 19 - p.51, L.24.) 
After the officer contacted a poison control center and described the pills that 
were in the bottles, Officer Schneider arrested Ms. Hartley and transported her to jail. 
(Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.29, L.16 - p.31, L.12.) Upon being booked into the jail, a search of 
Ms. Hartley's purse turned up another small baggie containing two blue pills. (Vol. 2 
8/10/10 Tr., p.31, L.13 - p.33, L.4.) 
During his testimony, Officer Schneider identified the three types of pills that 
were found in Ms. Hartley's purse as methadone, Methylphenidate, and Alprazolam. 
(Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.33, L.23 - p.38, L.11.) The Alprazolam pills were the blue pills 
found in the subsequent search of Ms. Hartley's purse at the jail. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 
Tr.,p.38, Ls.10-12.) When asked which doctors prescribed all of the medications, 
Officer Schneider testified that Ms. Hartley provided multiple names of different doctors 
from various areas throughout the State. He further testified that she was unable to 
name the pharmacy from which she filled the prescriptions. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.41, 
L.16-p.43, L.7.) 
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Following Officer Schneider's testimony, the State called the forensic chemist 
who performed the testing on the pills taken from Ms. Hartley's purse, Corinna Owsley. 
(Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.60, Ls.16-23.) Ms. Owsley testified as to the processes and 
procedures employed in the testing of pills in order to determine whether controlled 
substances are contained within them. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.63, L.3 - p.68, L.5.) 
According to her testimony, based upon the results of forensic testing, the pills from 
Ms. Hartley's purse contained methadone, Methylphenidate, and Alprazolam. (Vol. 2 
8/10/10 Tr., p.68, L.6 - p.72, L.18.) However, the pills that Ms. Owsley believed to be 
Alprazolam were not subjected to the same testing as the other pills, but were identified 
merely by the appearance and observable markings on the pills. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 
Tr., p.72, Ls.4-18.) 
The State's final witness was Frederick Collings, the chief investigator for the 
Idaho State Board of Pharmacy. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.83, Ls.6-18.) According to 
Mr. Collings, the board was required by statute to maintain a database of all 
prescriptions for scheduled controlled substances that are filled within, or shipped into, 
the state. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.83, L.19 - p.84, L.14.) The records maintained within 
the database covered a time period of at least the prior two years. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 
Tr., p.84, Ls.4-18.) Mr. Collings testified that, as of the date of his testimony at trial, 
Ms. Hartley did not have any prescriptions for methadone. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.85, 
L.21 - p.86, L.4.) He further testified that this meant Ms. Hartley did not personally fill 
any prescriptions for methadone within the entire prior two years. (Vol. 2 8/10/1 O 
Tr., p.86, L.17-20.) 
The State rested following Mr. Collings' testimony. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.90, 
Ls.8-9.) In her defense, Ms. Hartley called Christie Friesen to the stand. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 
5 
Tr., p.95, L.17 - p.96, L.5.) Ms. Friesen is the aunt of Ms. Hartley's husband. (Vol. 2 
8/10/10 Tr., p.96, Ls.14-15.) She testified that Ms. Hartley had repeatedly assisted her 
in the past with medical and other personal issues in Ms. Friesen's life. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 
Tr., pp.98, Ls.12-20.) Ms. Friesen also testified that one of her sisters was undergoing 
some struggles around the time of the charged offense - her sister was attempting to 
cope with a burgeoning addiction to prescription painkillers and had asked Ms. Hartley 
to hold onto these medications to keep her from abusing the pills. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 
Tr., p.96, L.20 - p.100, L.17.) One of the medications that Ms. Friesen's sister was 
abusing at this time was methadone. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.100, Ls.18-21.) Ms. Friesen 
was personally aware of her sister's prescription for methadone as Ms. Friesen had 
picked up this medication for her at various pharmacies many times before. (Vol. 2 
8/10/10Tr., p.102, L.10-p.103, L.5.) 
Ms. Friesen further testified that she had also asked Ms. Hartley to hold on to 
some of her own medications. She did so because Ms. Friesen was having some 
construction done on her home studio and her medications would go missing during the 
time that various people were inside of her home. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.103, L.22 -
p.105, L.11.) Among these medications were prescription Methylphenidate and 
Alprazolam pills. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.105, L.22 - p.106, L.3.) Ms. Friesen informed 
the jury that she had never seen Ms. Hartley ever abuse any prescription medications or 
ever give any prescription medications to anyone other than the person the drugs were 
prescribed for. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.111, Ls.6-15.) 
The defense rested following Ms. Friesen's testimony. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.129, 
Ls.10-12.) Thereafter, the district court took up the issue of whether the State's 
allegations of prior bad acts evidence would be admissible in rebuttal to Ms. Friesen's 
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testimony. The State argued that Ms. Friesen's testimony opened the door for the State 
to present the alleged other-acts evidence as rebuttal testimony. (Vol. 2 8/10/1 0 
Tr., p.129, L.24 - p.132, L.24.) According to the State's argument, testimony regarding 
Ms. Hartley's prior alleged possession of methadone was relevant to the issue of her 
motive in possessing the methadone in this case, as well as whether she had the intent 
to control the pills at the time. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.134, Ls.1-18.) 
Ms. Hartley responded that, even under the State's own account of the purported 
relevance of this evidence, it demonstrated nothing more than mere propensity, which 
was not permissible under the rules of evidence. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.137, L.25 -
p.140, L.7.) She further noted that introduction of this evidence also posed a substantial 
danger of confusing the issues at trial for the jury. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.139, Ls.1-7.) 
Finally, Ms. Hartley noted that the nearly one-year gap between her charged offense 
and the allegations of prior bad acts attenuated any relevance that the evidence might 
have otherwise had regarding her motive or intent on day of the charged offense. (Vol. 
2 8/10/10 Tr., p.138, Ls.6-10.) 
After taking a brief recess, the district court ruled that the State would be 
permitted to introduce evidence of Ms. Hartley's prior alleged possession of methadone 
and the admissions she made in conjunction with that possession. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 
Tr., p.140, L.17 - p.143, L.22.) But, most likely in recognition of the extreme potential 
for prejudice of this evidence, the district court crafted a jury instruction that informed 
the jurors that their consideration of this evidence was limited only to the allegation in 
this case that Ms. Hartley possessed methadone and only for the purpose of what her 
motive was in possessing that methadone. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.142, L.16 - p.143, 
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L. 7 .) The court also determined that the potential for prejudice of this evidence did not 
substantially outweigh its probative value. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.143, Ls.14-19.) 
Ms. Hartley continued to object to the introduction of this evidence. (Vol. 2 
8/10/10 Tr., p.143, L.23 - p.147, L.9.) Following the district court's ruling, the State 
called Corporal Michael Nauman to the stand to testify about the allegation that 
Ms. Hartley had previously been in possession of methadone pills and had admitted that 
they were for her own use. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.156, Ls.20-25.) The officer testified 
that, during a traffic stop of a car in which Ms. Hartley was a passenger, he found a 
bottle of methadone pills in Ms. Hartley's purse with the prescription label torn off of the 
bottle. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.157, Ls.1-17.) According to Corporal Nauman, Ms. Hartley 
admitted that the pills were hers and that they were methadone. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 
Tr., p.157, L.23 - p.158, L.5.) 
Ms. Hartley was convicted of all three counts of possession of a controlled 
substance. (8/11/10 Tr., p.53, L.1 - p.58, L.2; R., pp.115-117.) The district court 
sentenced Ms. Hartley to concurrent sentences of seven years, with one year fixed, for 
each count of felony possession of a controlled substance, and to 180 days 
incarceration - concurrent with her felony sentences - for her misdemeanor conviction 
for possession of a controlled substance. (11/8/10 Tr., p.31, L.25 - p.32, L.21; 
R., pp.122-124.) The district court further retained jurisdiction over Ms. Hartley's case. 
(11/8/10 Tr., p.32, Ls.22-23; R., pp.122-124.) Prior to the expiration of the court's 
period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Ms. Hartley on probation for 
seven years. (5/9/11 Tr., p.20, L.12 - p.21, L.22; Order Suspending Sentence and 
Order of Probation, Augment.) Ms. Hartley timely appeals from the district court's 
underlying judgment of conviction and sentence. (R., p.128.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it permitted the State to introduce prior 
bad acts evidence pursuant I.R.E. 404(b) over Ms. Hartley's objection? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Permitted The State To Introduce Prior 
Bad Acts Evidence Pursuant I.R.E. 404(8) Over Ms. Hartley's Objection 
A Introduction 
The district court in this case permitted the State to introduce evidence of a prior 
alleged unlawful possession of methadone as part of the State's rebuttal, ostensibly to 
prove Ms. Hartley's motive regarding the offense of unlawful possession of methadone 
in this case. Ms. Hartley asserts this was error. First, this evidence was only relevant to 
propensity, which under I.RE. 404(b) is not a permissible purpose for the introduction of 
other acts evidence at trial. Second, the potential for prejudice of this evidence 
outweighed any probative value for the jury, particularly in light of the significant lapse of 
time between the charged offense and the other-acts evidence. Finally, given the 
strong potential for the jury to treat this evidence as mere proof of propensity, the 
limiting instruction provided by the district court was inadequate to cure any resulting 
prejudice. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Upon review of the district court's determination to admit prior bad acts evidence 
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), this Court reviews both whether the evidence admitted was 
relevant to a material and disputed issue regarding the crime charged, other than 
propensity, and whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569 (2007). 
This Court generally reviews the district court's decision whether to admit prior bad acts 
evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Grist, 147 
Idaho 49, 51, (2009). Similarly, the district court's determination as to whether to admit 
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or to exclude evidence based upon the potential for prejudice of that evidence under 
I.RE. 403 is likewise reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, (2010). Three pertinent considerations are attendant 
upon review for an abuse of discretion: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived 
the issue as an issue of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted in accordance 
with applicable legal standards and within the proper bounds of its discretion; and (3) 
whether the district court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Id. 
However, the relevance of evidence is a question of law and therefore this Court 
reviews the district court's determination that evidence is relevant de novo. State v. 
Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764 (1993). 
C. The Prior Bad Acts Evidence Introduced By The State Under I.RE. 404(b) Was 
Mere Propensity Evidence And, Therefore, Should Have Been Excluded By The 
Trial Court 
The district court in this case erroneously permitted the State to introduce 
evidence against Ms. Hartley alleging that she had, on a prior occasion nearly one year 
prior to the charged offense, possessed methadone for her own personal use. (Vol. 2 
8/10/10 Tr., p.129, L.13 - p.144, L.13, p.156, L.20 - p.161, L.23.) Because this 
evidence was irrelevant to establish anything other than Ms. Hartley's criminal 
propensity, which is not permitted under I.RE. 404(b), Ms. Hartley asserts that 
admission of this evidence was error. 
It is so well established as to be axiomatic that proof of uncharged acts against a 
criminal defendant cannot be introduced in order to show a defendant's character or 
criminal propensity. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667. "Under I.RE. 404(b), evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to show a defendant's criminal 
propensity." Id. This is because character or propensity evidence, "takes the jury away 
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from their primary consideration of guilt or innocence of the particular crime on trial." 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. 
Such evidence may, however, be admissible for a non-propensity or character 
purpose so long as the prosecution provides timely notice of its intent to use such 
evidence. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667. Evidence that tends to show merely generalized 
similarities between the charged conduct and prior alleged acts is most accurately 
described as showing mere propensity to commit the charged offense, and therefore 
such evidence should not be admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). Id. at 669, n.5. 
Moreover, where the assumption of the defendant's criminal character or 
propensity is a necessary link in the chain of inferences for a purported non-propensity 
purpose, such evidence should be excluded pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). This was made 
clear by the Idaho Supreme Court in Grist. In that case, the Court held that "courts of 
this state must not permit the introduction of mere propensity evidence merely by 
relabeling it," under the rubric of a non-propensity purpose. Grist, 147 Idaho at 53-54. 
Meaning that merely invoking a non-propensity purpose is not sufficient - if the 
evidence necessarily requires an assumption of propensity in order to be relevant, then 
the evidence is not admissible. Numerous other jurisdictions have likewise made 
abundantly clear that, even where the State proffers a supposedly non-propensity 
purpose, the evidence cannot be admitted where any link in the chain of inferences to 
support that purpose contains the prohibited propensity inference. See, e.g., U.S. v. 
Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 321 (3d Cir. 
2002); U.S. v. Commanche, 577 F.3d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 2009); People v. 
Thompson, 611 P.3d 883, 889 (Cal. 1980); State v. Giddings, 208 P.3d 363, 366 (Mont. 
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2009); State v. Melcher, 678 A2d 146, 150 (N.H. 1996); State v. Nelson, 501 S.E.2d 
716, 722-723 (S.C. 1998). 
In this case, the prior bad acts evidence that the State was permitted to introduce 
following Ms. Hartley's presentation of evidence was not relevant to any issue other 
than merely to demonstrate her propensity to commit one of the crimes charged -
possession of methadone - and therefore this evidence was not properly admissible 
into evidence. Ms. Hartley emphasized this to the district court in objecting to the 
introduction of this evidence at trial. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.137, L.25-p.138, L.2.) 
The purported ground for relevance that was relied upon by the district court was 
proof of Ms. Hartley's motive in allegedly possessing methadone in the charged offense. 
(Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.141, Ls.11-17.) However, in order to find any relevance to the 
charged offense of Ms. Hartley's prior possession of methadone her own use, a fact 
finder would necessarily have to assume the forbidden propensity evidence in order to 
find this evidence as proof of her motive in the charged offense. In other words, a juror 
could only find this evidence relevant to Ms. Hartley's motive regarding the instant 
charge of possession of methadone if the jury assumed that Ms. Hartley had a 
propensity to possess methadone for her own use in light of the fact that she had done 
so in the past. Because the purported grounds of admissibility of the prior bad acts 
evidence in this case was nothing more than proof of propensity, such evidence was not 
admissible under the plain terms of I.R.E. 404(b). See also Grist, 147 Idaho at 53-54. 
Additionally, as was noted by Ms. Hartley, the length of time between the prior 
alleged possession and her charged offense attenuated any relevance that the other 
acts evidence would have had. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.138, Ls.2-9.) The passage of time 
between the charged offense and the alleged prior bad acts can attenuate any 
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relevance of this evidence. See, e.g., Cooke v. State, 144 Idaho 233, 241 (Ct. App. 
201 O); State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340-342 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Whatever Ms. Hartley's motive was with regard her alleged possession of 
methadone almost one year prior to the alleged offense, there is no evidence showing 
how this past motive in any way related to her motive or intentions regarding the 
charged offense. Given the significant passage of time between the two alleged 
possessions, there is no proper basis upon which to conclude that Ms. Hartley's mental 
state regarding the prior alleged possession had any bearing for what her motivation 
was approximately one year later (other than for purposes of demonstrating criminal 
propensity). Given this, the district court erred when it admitted the State's prior bad 
acts evidence in this case. 
D. The Potential For Unfair Prejudice Of The Prior Bad Acts Evidence Introduced By 
The State Substantially Outweighed Any Probative Value. And Therefore The 
District Court Should Have Excluded This Evidence Under I.RE. 403 
Ms. Hartley also objected to the admission of prior bad acts evidence on the 
basis that, under I.R. 403, the potential for unfair prejudice of this evidence 
substantially outweighed any probative value and was likely to mislead and confuse the 
jurors regarding what were legitimate issues at trial. (Vol. 2 8/10/10 Tr., p.139, L.1 -
p.140, L.7.) 
When confronted with the issue of admissibility of alleged prior bad acts 
evidence, the district court must also determine, pursuant to I. R. 403, whether the 
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. As has been previously noted, there was no 
legitimate probative value to the other-acts evidence introduced by the State: it merely 
demonstrated propensity which is not a proper consideration for the jury in determining 
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Ms. Hartley's guilt of the charged offense. Therefore there was no legitimate probative 
value to this evidence at all. 
However, the potential for prejudice of this evidence was very high - and it was 
not limited to merely the charge in this case of possession of methadone. Because this 
evidence merely demonstrated propensity, its sole purpose for the jurors was to cast 
Ms. Hartley in the light of an individual who had the criminal propensity to unlawfully 
possess drugs. Given that all three charges in this case were of exactly this type of 
conduct - unlawful possession of prescription medications - any demonstration of 
criminal propensity would carry over to all three offenses. 
Because there was no legitimate probative value to the other-acts evidence 
introduced by the State in this case, and an incredibly high danger of unfair prejudice, 
the district court abused its discretion when it determined that this evidence was 
admissible under 1.R.E. 403. 
E. The Limiting Instruction Provided By The District Court Did Not Cure The 
Prejudice Flowing From The Erroneous Introduction Of Prior Bad Acts Evidence 
In This Case 
While the district court did provide a limiting instruction in this case regarding the 
manner in which the jury was to consider the prior bad acts evidence in this case, 
Ms. Hartley submits that this limiting instruction did not cure the resulting harm of this 
evidence. 
In some cases, "a limiting instruction alone cannot always prevent an error from 
prejudicing the defendant," with regard to the erroneous introduction of prior bad acts 
evidence. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 670. This is particularly the case when the evidence 
has the potential to demonstrate mere propensity of the defendant to engage in conduct 
similar to the charged offense. Id. 
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Here the district court did provide a limiting instruction to the jury with regard to 
the prior bad acts evidence that the State was allowed to present to the jury. (Vol. 2 
8/10/10 Tr., p.155, L.22 - p.156, L.12.) However, Ms. Hartley submits that this 
instruction was inadequate to cure the prejudice flowing from the erroneous introduction 
of prior bad acts evidence. 
While the district court instructed the jury that they could only consider evidence 
of Ms. Hartley's prior alleged unlawful possession of methadone, the court's instruction 
informed the jury that they could consider this evidence, "for the limited purpose of 
proving the defendant's motive in allegedly possessing the controlled substance alleged 
in Count 1." As has been previously noted, the only way Ms. Hartley's motive in 
possessing the methadone nearly one year prior could be relevant to the charged 
offense is if the jury were to assume that Ms. Hartley had the criminal propensity to 
unlawfully possess prescription drugs for her own use. In light of this, the court's 
supposed limiting instruction would actually permit the jury to make a propensity 
inference regarding Ms. Hartley, albeit under the guise of determining her "motive." 
Moreover, given the similarity between the three charged offenses in this case 
and Ms. Hartley's alleged prior possession of methadone, the propensity inference 
would be nearly inescapable for the jury, regardless of the instruction provided. Given 
this, it cannot be said that the error in introducing this evidence was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, even with the limiting instruction provided by the district court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Hartley asks that this Court reverse her judgment of conviction and 
sentences for possession of a controlled substance and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 9th day of November, 2011. 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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